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ABSTRACT 
Computer-based information systems in general, and Internet e-commerce and e-business 
systems in particular, employ many types of resources that need to be protected against access 
by unauthorized users. Three main components of access control are used in most information 
systems: identification, authentication, and authorization. In this paper we focus on 
authentication, which is the most problematic component. The three main approaches to user 
authentication are: knowledge-based, possession-based, and biometric-based. We review and 
compare the various authentication mechanisms of these approaches and the technology and 
implementation issues they involve. 
Our conclusion is that there is no silver bullet solution to user authentication problems. 
Authentication practices need improvement.  Further research should lead to a better 
understanding of user behavior and the applied psychology aspects of computer security. 
Keywords: information systems security, identification, authentication, authorization, passwords, 
question-and-answer passwords, primary passwords, secondary passwords, associative 
passwords, cognitive passwords 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The use of the Internet and other information technologies is an integral part of business strategy. 
With so many companies taking advantage of these technologies for their own information 
systems, for business exchange, and for e-commerce, the security problems that their use entails 
is an issue of primary concern if their potential is not to be limited. Information systems in general 
and Internet information systems in particular need to ensure that only the intended users can 
access their resources. The three main components of access control identification, 
authentication, and authorization, are closely related.  In security systems, however, they should 
be operated apart. Failure to do so can lead to serious security problems [Auernheimer and Tasi, 
2005]. 
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Identification – "Who are you?" – Users supply information to identify themselves, such as name, 
username, and user ID. Supplying identification information does not prove that the user is who 
he says he is.  
Authentication – "Prove your identification" – The user verifies her identity. Some examples of 
authentication mechanisms are user-selected passwords, system-generated passwords, 
passphrases, question-and-answer passwords, tokens, and various biometrics characteristics. 
For most systems, identification and authentication are the first line of defense to prevent 
unauthorized users from entering the system. 
Authorization – "What you are allowed to do" – The system determines what the identified and 
authenticated user can actually access and what operations he is allowed to carry out. 
Authorization is based on predefined criteria and user profiles. 
These three components of access control can be found in almost all information systems. The 
most problematic is the authentication component. The traditional and conventional approaches 
for authorization and access control [Pernul, 1995], are not appropriate for addressing the 
requirements of networked Internet or distributed information systems [Lopez et al., 2004]. Other 
technologies and approaches need to be considered [Adams and Lloyd, 1999; Ashley and 
Vandenwauver, 1999; Oppliger, 2002]. 
The traditional and by far most widely used form of authentication is the password. However, as 
the number of systems used by individual users grows and the number of passwords required 
increases, users tend to duplicate their passwords and cause the domino effect of password 
reuse [Ives et al., 2004], namely, all the systems with the same password are no more secure 
than the weakest system using this password.  
In this paper we review and compare the three main approaches to authentication and their 
methods, as well as technology and implementation issues concerning these methods. 
II. AUTHENTICATION 
Most computer systems are protected through a process of user identification and authentication 
[Garfinkel and Spafford, 1996]. While identification is usually non-private information provided by 
the user to identify herself and can be known by system administrators and other system users, 
authentication provides secret, private information. The authentication methods can be divided 
into three types [Menkus, 1988]:  
• What the user knows (e.g. password, PIN (personal identification number), question-and-
answer), referred to as knowledge-based authentication. It is based on private information 
supplied by the user. 
• What the user has (e.g. memory card and smart card tokens), referred to as possession-
based authentication. It is based on private objects that the user possesses.   
• What the user is (e.g. fingerprint, iris scan, signature dynamics), referred to as biometric-
based authentication. It is based on anatomical, physiological, or behavioral 
characteristics. 
Figure 1 describes identification and the three authentication types. 
Identification and Authentication: Technology and Implementation Issues by M. Zviran and Z. Erlich 
Communications of Association for Information Systems (Volume 17 2006) 90-105 92 
 
Identification 
 
• Name 
• User ID 
• Username 
• E-mail address 
• ... 
 
 
Authentication 
 
What the User Knows  
• Password  
• PIN 
• Passphrases  
• … 
What the User Has  
• Smart token  
• Smart card  
• Credit card  
• Digital signature  
• … 
What the User Is  
• Fingerprint  
• Finger scan  
• Iris scan  
• Retina scan  
• Facial scan  
• Keyboard dynamics  
• Mouse dynamics  
• … 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Identification and Authentication Types 
 
While it may appear that any of these types can provide efficient authentication, each exhibits its 
own benefits and drawbacks. Tradeoffs need to be made among security, ease of use, and ease 
of administration.  
The authentication types can be used alone or in combination. If one type is being used, it is 
referred to as one-type or single-factor authentication; if two types are used, it is two-type or two-
factor authentication; and if all three types are used, it is referred to as three-type or multi-factor 
authentication. For the authentication process to be considered strong, it must be at least two-
type.  
KNOWLEDGE-BASED AUTHENTICATION  
The most widely used type of authentication is knowledge-based authentication. Examples of 
knowledge-based authentications are passwords, pass-phrases or pass-sentences [Spector and 
Ginzberg, 1994], graphical passwords [Blonder, 1996; Davis et al., 2004; Thorpe and van 
Oorschot, 2004; Wiedenbeck et al., 2005], pass-faces [Brostoff and Sasse, 2000] and PINs. The 
traditional and by far most widely used form of authentication based on the user's knowledge is 
the password [Cooper, 1989; Zviran and Haga, 1993]. 
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A password is conceptually simple for both system designers and end users. It consists of a 
secret series of characters according some predefined rules. The user ID and password pair 
serves for user identification and authentication to ensure that unauthorized users do not access 
the system and to block unauthorized access to the computing resources. In most systems it can 
provide effective protection if it is used correctly.  
However, passwords are known to suffer from several pitfalls due to human information 
processing limitations [Jobusch and Oldehoeft, 1989a, 1989b; Hitchings, 1995; Adams and 
Sasse, 1999; Sasse et al., 2001; Carstens et al., 2004: Yan et al., 2004, 2005].  
1. The tradeoff between memorizing and safety. Passwords should be difficult to guess and easy 
to remember [Barton and Barton, 1984; Pfleeger, 1989]. Unfortunately, difficult to guess and 
crack passwords are difficult to remember and easy to remember passwords are easy to guess 
and crack.  That poses a dilemma in the generation of passwords. The most secure password is 
a random string of characters, such as qktPew3# [Porter, 1982; Wood, 1983; Barton and Barton, 
1984; Garfinkel and Spafford, 1996]. Such passwords are difficult to guess by others, but are 
difficult to remember. To remember them, users write them down [Paans and Herschberg, 1987], 
which reduces their secrecy. Moreover, most users have multiple passwords for different systems 
and applications, forcing them to remember several passwords [Adams and Sasse, 1999]. To 
help them remember, they usually choose meaningful strings such as name, nickname, or initials 
[Barton and Barton, 1984; Menkus, 1988; Riddle et al., 1989; Adams and Sasse, 1999], which are 
easy to remember but also easy to crack.  
2. Follow rules. To improve password security, the following rules are suggested for choosing and 
maintaining passwords [Smith, 2002]: 
• Non-dictionary and no-name passwords – a non-dictionary word prevents the use of 
dictionary-based attacks. The only way to identify non-dictionary or no-name passwords is 
by using brute force, which requires testing all the possible combinations of characters for 
every length of password.  
• Long enough passwords with mixed types of characters – passwords with at least eight 
characters with upper and lower case letters, numbers and special symbols. Long 
passwords with mixed types of characters increase the number of possible combinations 
that need to be tested in the brute force method. 
• Password aging and not reusing – periodic changing and not reusing passwords forces the 
intruder to identify a new password each time. Thus, it is good practice to establish a 
password aging policy that forces users to change passwords periodically, but not too 
frequently, to avoid irritating users. 
• Complex yet easy to remember passwords – passwords based on data structures that 
users are accustomed to remembering, like creating acronyms from a personal sentence 
known only to the user [Carstens et al., 2004; Yan et al., 2005], or the use of certain 
elements such as rhymes that make the password more memorable. Yan et al. [2005] 
observed that passwords based on mnemonic phrases are just as hard to crack as random 
passwords yet are just as easy to remember as naïve user selections. 
• Passwords should not be shared and should not be written – writing down or sharing 
passwords harms their secrecy. 
Passwords that follow these suggestions are more effective, more difficult to identify, and harder 
to determine by cracking utilities. To improve their security, the strength of passwords should be 
verified by the system administrators using password cracking programs like dictionary attack 
programs and/or brute force attack programs. It is common practice for system administrators to 
invoke reactive password checkers to identify weak passwords or to use proactive checkers to 
filter out certain classes of weak passwords when the user inputs the password for the first time 
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[Bishop and Klein, 1995]. Also, password files should be protected properly and the passwords 
should be encrypted or hashed. 
3. Human authentication.  Some mechanisms ensure human authentication and protect against 
automated programs used by attackers. An example of such a mechanism is the one used by 
Microsoft Hotmail™, which introduces a picture with some character set and asks the user to 
identify the character set in the picture, as shown in Figure 2. This mechanism is based on the 
presumption that in most cases an automated program cannot recognize the characters in the 
picture. 
One way to overcome the problem of sniffing passwords when authentication is done over the 
Internet is by one-time password which can be implemented using smart cards – a possession-
based authentication discussed below. 
 
Figure 2. Microsoft Hotmail™ Check to Ensure Human Identification 
 
TYPES OF PASSWORDS  
Password types are categorized in several ways. One categorization is into primary and 
secondary passwords, according to their level of authentication. 
Primary and Secondary Passwords 
Passwords that are used as the first level of authentication, allowing access to the information 
system resources through the operating systems, are commonly referred to as primary 
passwords [Ahituv et al., 1987; Pfleeger, 1989]. Passwords that are used as the second level of 
authentication, for further control and protection of multilevel access to segments of these 
resources, sensitive applications, or data files, are commonly referred to as secondary passwords 
[Haga and Zviran, 1991; Zviran and Haga, 1993]. While the mechanisms employed in primary 
passwords are determined by the operating system manufacturer, information systems designers 
can select any password mechanism for secondary passwords.  
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The format of primary passwords determined by the operating system manufacturer uses system-
generated passwords or user-generated passwords with some predefined rules. With system-
generated passwords, a password is automatically generated by the operating system and 
assigned to a user. User-generated passwords are shown to be easier to remember but less 
secure than system-generated passwords because they are easier to guess [Lopez et al., 2004]. 
Question-and-Answer Passwords 
Question-and-answer passwords are also called secret questions or security questions. Used 
mostly as a secondary password, they involve a dialogue between the user and the system 
where the user responds to a set of brief questions about personal facts, opinions, and cues.  
Thus, in Microsoft Hotmail™, when a user opens a new account, after entering the primary 
password, she must also enter the question-and-answer password (the secret question), as 
shown in Figure 3. This password is mainly used when the user forgets her primary password 
and wants the system to help her to recall it. 
Question-and-answer passwords were suggested as a method of overcoming the difficulty of 
remembering passwords. In a typical question-and-answer session, a user is presented with 
several randomly selected questions from a set of questions stored in his profile in the operating 
system. Access to a system or a particular application is granted only upon a match between the 
user's answers and those stored in the profile.  
The two main methods of question-and-answer passwords are: cognitive passwords and 
associative passwords, also called word association passwords [Smith, 1987; Haga and Zviran, 
1991; Zviran and Haga, 1993; Bunnell et al., 1997; Pond et al., 2000].  
 
 
Figure 3. Microsoft Hotmail™ Secondary Question-And-Answer Password 
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Cognitive passwords. A cognitive password is something the user need not try to remember, he 
just knows it.  In cognitive passwords, the user provides the system with answers to personal 
fact-based or opinion-based questions [Haga and Zviran, 1989], such as the user's mother's 
maiden name (fact-based) or user's favorite type of music (opinion-based). Because cognitive 
passwords were found to be easier to recall than conventional passwords and difficult to guess 
when selected properly, they are recommended as a way to overcome the difficulty of composing 
effective passwords [Zviran and Haga, 1990a, 1990b, 1993]. 
Bunnell et al. [1997] and Zviran and Haga [1990a, 1990b, 1993] found similar high recall rates for 
fact-based and opinion-based cognitive items. They also found similar low guessing rates for 
opinion-based cognitive items. However, Bunnell et al. [1997] found a guessing rate for fact-
based items to be much higher than that obtained by Zviran and Haga [1990a, 1993], which led 
them to the conclusion that guessability for such items is too high unless items are carefully 
selected. Podd et al. [1996] also found high recall rates for cognitive items similar to those 
obtained by Zviran and Haga [1990a, 1990b, 1993]. They found unacceptably high guessing 
rates for fact-based cognitive items and acceptable guessing and recall rates for the best of the 
opinion-based items. Bunnell et al. [1997] found that fact-based cognitive items were better 
recalled than opinion-based items.  
Thus, carefully selected cognitive items can yield acceptable recall and guessing rates. In tandem 
with a conventional password, they could improve security. 
Associative passwords. In associative passwords, new users are asked to provide the system 
with a set of word associations, consisting of both cues and their unique associated responses 
[Smith, 1987]. To access the system, users must provide the correct associated responses to 
rotating cues sampled from the set of cues that were provided to the system.  Smith [1987] 
argued for improved security with a secondary technique, like an associative password, rather 
than increasing password complexity. Research, however, yielded inconsistent results about 
recall and guessing associative passwords [Pond et al., 2000].  
Pond et al. [2000] studied the effect of three different formulation techniques of associated 
passwords on recall rates:  
• Response only – respondents are provided with cue words and are required to generate an 
associated response for each cue;  
• Cues and responses – respondents generate both cues and associated responses;  
• Theme – respondents generate both cue and response words having first decided upon a 
theme for their word association.  
No statistically significant differences in recall and guessing rates were found among the three 
techniques, leading to the tentative conclusion that the effect of these formulation techniques on 
ease of recall is small.    
Associative passwords require more research to isolate the best method of generating them 
[Bunnell et al., 1997; Pond et al., 2000]. 
Comparison of Knowledge-based Passwords  
This subsection compares the findings of three studies of knowledge-based passwords. 
In measuring the recall of self-generated passwords, system-generated passwords, passphrases, 
cognitive passwords, and associative passwords, Zviran and Hega [1993] found that the recall 
rate of associative passwords was more than double the recall rate for the other three.  In 
addition, cognitive passwords resulted in a slightly higher recall rate than associative passwords. 
In comparing recall and guessing rates for conventional, cognitive, and associative passwords, 
Podd et al. [1996] found that associative passwords produced low guessing rates but also low 
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recall rates, whereas cognitive passwords produced the highest recall rates but also a high 
guessing rate. 
Recall and guessing rates for several types of knowledge-based passwords were studied by 
Bunnell et al. [1997]. They examined:  
• conventional passwords (including user self-generated and assigned system-generated)  
• cognitive passwords (including fact-based and opinion-based), and  
• associative passwords.  
They found that conventional self-generated and assigned system-generated passwords resulted 
in relatively high recall rates coupled with relatively low guessability rates. The guessability rates 
for the fact-based and opinion-based cognitive items were high. The fact-based cognitive items 
yielded the highest recall rates but their guessability rate was much too high. However, the best 
fact-based and opinion-based items resulted in relatively low guessability and reasonably high 
recall rates. On the other hand, associative items produced low guessability rates but also 
relatively poor recall rates. 
POSSESSION-BASED AUTHENTICATION  
Authentication based on what the user has is referred to as possession-based or token-based 
authentication. It makes use mainly of physical objects that a user possesses, like tokens. 
However, presentation of a valid token does not prove ownership because it may have been 
stolen or duplicated by sophisticated fraudulent means [Svigals, 1994]. Tokens also create 
problems of administration and are inconvenient for users to carry around. 
Types of Tokens 
Tokens are usually divided into memory tokens and smart tokens. 
Memory tokens. Memory tokens store information but do not process it. Special devices are 
needed to write and read the data to and from the tokens. The most common type of memory 
token is the magnetic card, which is used mostly for authentication together with a knowledge-
based authentication mechanism such as the user's PIN. Memory tokens are inexpensive to 
produce. Using them with PINs provides significantly more security than PINs or passwords 
alone. 
Smart tokens. Unlike memory tokens, smart tokens incorporate one or more embedded 
integrated circuits which enable them to process information. Like memory tokens, most smart 
tokens are used for authentication together with a knowledge-based authentication mechanism 
such as the user's PIN. Of the various types of smart tokens, the most widely used are those that 
house an integrated chip containing a microprocessor. The smart cards are used in the 
identification and authentication processes, both in networked and stand-alone computer 
systems. Their portability and cryptographic capacity led to their wide use in many e-commerce 
applications [Juang, 2004]. When using smart cards for authentication, the card must first be 
physically presented to the computer system. Then authentication of the card by the system is 
performed, a process that usually involves execution of cryptological algorithms.  
Authentication schemes proposed for enhancing the efficiency and security of smart cards 
include: 
1. Timestamp-based authentication schemes to prevent malicious replay attacks in networks 
[Yang and Shieh, 1999; Chan and Cheng, 2000; Hwang and Li, 2000; Sun, 2000; Lee, Li and 
Hwang, 2002; Lee, Hwang and Yang, 2002; Chan and Cheng, 2002; Fan et al., 2002; Wu and 
Chieu, 2003; Jiang et al., 2004; Wu and Chen, 2004; Yang and Wang, 2004].  
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2. Juang [2004] suggested an efficient password authenticated key agreement using smart cards. 
The main merits of his scheme are: 
• no password or verification table is required in the server;  
• users can freely choose their own passwords;  
• communication and computation costs are low;  
• it requires mutual authentication (user-server); and  
• it incorporates a key agreement mechanism by generating a session key agreed on by the 
user and the server. 
Due to their complexity, smart tokens are more expensive than memory tokens but they provide 
greater flexibility and security and are more difficult to forge. Because of their high security level, 
smart tokens are also used for one-time passwords for authentication across an open network.  
BIOMETRIC-BASED AUTHENTICATION  
We refer to authentication based on what the user is as biometric-based authentication; namely, 
automatic identification using certain anatomical, behavioral, and physiological features and 
characteristics associated with the user [Kim, 1995; Prabhakar et al., 2003].  
Biometric authentications are based on physiological or behavioral characteristics that reliably 
distinguish one person from another. Thus, it is possible to establish an identity based on who the 
user is, rather than by what the user possesses or knows and remembers. Biometrics includes 
both the collection and the comparison of these characteristics. A biometric system can be 
viewed as a pattern recognition system consisting of three main modules:  
• the sensor module,  
• the feature extraction module, and  
• the feature matching module. 
The users' personal attributes are captured and stored in reference files to be compared for later 
authentication to determine if a match exists. The biometric system is composed of biometric data 
of the captured users' personal attributes necessary to perform user authentication and the 
software and hardware required to collect, store, and process the biometric data.  
Biometric authentications are technically complex and usually expensive because they require 
special hardware. They are quite secure, but are not widely accepted by users because they are 
perceived to be intrusive and an encroachment on personal privacy through automated means. 
They also raise ethical issues [Alterman, 2003], such as potential misuse of the personal 
biometrics for tracking and monitoring productivity [Deane et al., 1995]. Their main use is in 
systems requiring a high level of security. 
The emergence of biometrics addressed the problems that plague traditional verification 
methods. They provide the most effective and accurate identification method because they 
cannot easily be stolen or shared. Biometric systems also enhance user convenience by 
alleviating the need to design and remember passwords. However, while convenient, the digital 
scan or pattern is vulnerable to network analysis and once stolen, cannot be used any more [Ives 
et al., 2004]. 
All biometric technologies inherently suffer from some level of false match or false non-match 
[Matyas and Stapleton, 2000]. False match is a type II error –accepting a match when there is no 
match. False non-match is a type I error –rejecting the match when there is a match. Biometric 
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errors can occur for several reasons: the capture device might be dirty, the lighting might be poor, 
and the system might not adjust well to different environmental factors such as sun, cold, or glare 
[O'Gorman, 2003], and also due to the user's physiological changes because of surgery and 
other conditions. Thresholds of acceptance for any of the biometric techniques depend on the 
level of security required by the computer system. A high-security system, like a finance or health 
system, will minimize the false match (type II error) rate at the expense of increasing the false 
non-match (type I error) rate. A low-security system will minimize the false non-match rate at the 
expense of increasing the false match rate. 
Physiological and Behavioral Biometrics 
Biometrics are usually divided into two main categories: physiological and behavioral biometrics. 
Physiological biometrics 
Physiological biometrics are based on the user's stable physical attributes. The best known are: 
Fingerprint – a computerized version of the traditional fingerprint identification system, based on 
the surface of curves formed by the ridges on a fingertip. It generates much information, which 
requires a large amount of storage [Roddy and Stosz, 1997]. Biometric devices that read 
fingerprints and plug into USB ports are widely available [Auernheimer and Tasi, 2005].  
Finger scan – based on the extract of specific features from finger print data, they store and use 
selective points on the fingerprint.  Finger scan collects and uses a smaller amount of data than 
fingerprint data.  
Hand geometry – based on measures of the physical shape and dimensions of the hand. The 
method uses a small camera.  
Iris scan – based on the unique pattern, rings, and corona in the iris using a snapshot of the iris, 
taken by a camera. It requires the camera to be properly placed so that the sun does not shine 
into its aperture.  
Retina scan – based on the pattern of the blood vessels on the backside of the eyeball. The iris 
scan is more acceptable than the retina scan because it requires only a glance while the retina 
scan blows air into the eye. 
Facial scan – based on attributes of the face, bone structure, nose ridges, and eye width [Li and 
Jain, 2005]. 
Fingerprints continue to be the most widely used physiological characteristic in systems that 
automatically recognize a user's identity [Jones, 2000; Maltoni et al., 2003; Wayman et al., 2004; 
Ratha and Bolle, 2005]. An example of one of its up to date applications is the use of fingerprint-
based identification and authentication to support on-line, web-based course examinations 
[Auernheimer and Tasi, 2005]. 
Behavioral biometrics 
Behavioral biometrics are based on user behavioral attributes that are learned movements. The 
best known are: 
Keystroke or keyboard dynamics and signature dynamics – based on the different typing 
dynamics, they try to capture the electrical signals for speed and movements while users are 
typing or signing [Obaidat and Sadoun, 1997].  
Mouse dynamics is similar to keyboard and signature dynamics in that users can be identified by 
the way in which they use the mouse. This method was found to be less effective than keyboard 
and signature dynamics [Guven and Sogukpinar, 2003]. 
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Speech or voice verification – based on the user’s voice pattern, when speaking into the 
computer's microphone, it recognizes subtle differences in speech sounds and patterns. Speech 
is usually categorized as behavioral because it is a product of learned behavior, although the 
underlying body feature upon which speech is based is a vocal apparatus, which is physical and 
relatively stable [O'Gorman, 2003]. 
III. COMPARING THE THREE AUTHENTICATION TYPES 
The factors that need to be considered when choosing an authentication method are [Furnell et 
al., 2000]: 
• effectiveness,  
• ease of implementation,  
• ease of use, and 
• user attitude and acceptance. 
The knowledge-based authentication method is inexpensive and easy to implement and change. 
Unfortunately it is also the easiest to compromise and is less secure than tokens or biometric-
authentication methods, which are inherently more secure. On the other hand, tokens and 
biometric-authentication methods are more expensive to implement. User’s prefer knowledge-
based authentication and do not like biometric-based authentication. 
Table 1 shows the ranking of the three authentication types according to the four factors.  
Table1. Authentication Types and Their Ranking 
Type of authentication Effectiveness Ease of 
implement-
ation 
Ease of use User 
attitude 
Knowledge-based Low High High High 
Possession-based Medium Medium Medium Medium 
Biometric-based High Low Low Low 
 
Because knowledge-based authentication is less effective than the other two types, it is 
recommended that it be used as part of a two-type authentication. For example, authentication 
can be based on a password and token or it can be based on a password and keystroke [Furnell 
et al., 2004, Yu and Cho, 2004]. 
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
No silver bullet solution exists to user authentication problems. Computer systems are protected 
by three main types of authentication methods: knowledge-based, possession-based, and 
biometric-based. Each of these offers both benefits and drawbacks. Multiple layers of protection 
provide substantially better security. When choosing an authentication method, the tradeoff 
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among security effectiveness, ease of implementation, ease of use, and user attitude and 
acceptance needs to be considered.  
As long as passwords are comparatively inexpensive, simple to use, and attractive to users, they 
will probably continue to be employed in low to medium security information systems for the 
foreseeable future. When properly managed in a controlled environment, they can provide 
effective security. 
Further research is needed on the three authentication types to improve and enhance their 
technologies and to enable the design of more usable and effective security systems. 
REFERENCES 
Adams, A. and M. A. Sasse (1999) "Users are Not the Enemy: Why Users Compromise Security 
Mechanisms and How to Take Remedial Measures," Communications of the ACM, 
42(12), pp. 40-46. 
Adams, C. and S. Lloyd (1999) Understanding Public-Key Infrastructure: Concepts, Standards 
and Deployment Considerations, Indianapolis, IN: Macmillan Technical Publishing,  
Ahituv, N., Y. Lapid, and S. Neumann (1987) "Verifying the Authentication of an Information 
System User," Computers and Security, 6(2), pp. 152-157.  
Alterman, A (2003) "A Piece of Yourself: Ethical Issues in Biometric Identification", Ethics and 
Information Technology, 5(3), pp. 139-150. 
Ashley, P. and M. Vandenwauver (1999) Practical Intranet Security: Overview of the State of the 
Art and Available Technologies, Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Auernheimer, B. and M. J. Tasi (2005) "Biometric Authentication for Web-based Course 
Examinations," Proceedings of the 38th Annual Hawaii International Conference on 
System Science (HICSS'05), pp. 294-300. 
Barton, B. F. and M. S. Barton (1984) "User-Friendly Password Methods for Computer-Mediated 
Information Systems," Computers and Security, 3(3), pp. 186-195.  
Bishop, M. and D. Klein (1995) "Improving System Security Through Proactive Password 
Checking," Computers and Security, 14(3), pp. 233-249. 
Blonder, G. E. (1996) Graphical Passwords. United States Patent 5559961. 
Brostoff, S. and M A. Sasse (2000) "Are Passfaces more Usable than Passwords? A Field Trial 
Investigation," in S. McDonald, Y. Waern, and G. Cockton (Eds.), People and Computers 
XIV - Usability or Else! Proceedings of HCI2000, Sunderland, Springer, UK, pp. 405-424.  
Bunnell, J., J. Podd, R. Henderson, R. Napier, and J. Kennedy-Moffat (1997) "Cognitive, 
Associative and Conventional Passwords: Recall and Guessing Rates," Computers and 
Security, 16(7), pp. 629-641. 
Carstens, D. S., P. R. McCauley-Bell, L. C. Malone, and R. F. DeMara (2004) "Evaluation of the 
Human Impact of Password Authentication Practices on Information Security," 
Information Science Journal, 7(1), pp. 67-85. 
Chan, C. K. and L. M. Cheng (2000) “Cryptanalysis of a Remote User Authentication Scheme 
Using Smart Cards,” IEEE Trans. Consumer Electronic, 46(4), pp. 992-993. 
Chan, C. K. and L. M. Cheng (2002). "Cryptanalysis of a Timestamp-based Password 
Authentication Scheme," Computer Security, 21(1), pp. 74-76. 
Cooper, J. (1989) Computer and Communications Security, New York: McGraw-Hill.  
Davis, D., F. Monrose, and M. Reiter (2004). “On User Choice in Graphical Password Schemes,” 
Proceedings of the 13th USENIX Security Symposium, San Diego, CA. 
Deane, F., K. Barrelle, R. Henderson, and D. Mahar (1995). "Perceived Acceptability of Biometric 
Security Systems," Computers and Security 14(3), pp. 225-231.  
Fan L., J. H. Li, and H. W. Zhu (2002) "An Enhancement of Timestamp-based Password 
Authentication Scheme," Computers and Security, 21(7), pp. 665-667.  
 Furnell, S. M., P. S. Dowland, M. H. Illingworth, and P. L. Reynolds (2000) "Authentication and 
Supervision: A Survey of User Attitudes," Computers and Security 19(6), pp. 529-539. 
Furnell, S. M., I. Papadopoulos, and P. S. Dowland (2004) "A Long-Term Trial of Alternative User 
Authentication Technologies," Information Management and Computer Security, 12(2), 
pp. 178-190. 
Identification and Authentication: Technology and Implementation Issues by M. Zviran and Z. Erlich 
Communications of Association for Information Systems (Volume 17 2006) 90-105 102 
Garfinkel, S. and G. Spafford (1996) Practical Unix and Internet Security, Sebastopol, CA: 
O'Reilly & Associates,. 
Guven, A. and I. Sogukpinar (2003) "Understanding Users' Keystroke Patterns for Computer 
Access Security," Computers & Security, 22(8), pp. 695-706. 
Haga, W. J. and M. Zviran (1989) "Cognitive Passwords: From Theory to Practice," Data 
Processing and Communications Security, 13(3), pp. 19-23. 
Haga, W. J. and M. Zviran (1991) "Question-and-Answer Passwords: An Empirical Evaluation," 
Information Systems, 16(3), pp. 335-343. 
Hitchings, J. (1995) "Deficiencies of the Traditional Approach to Information Security and the 
Requirements for a New Methodology," Computers and Security, 14(5), pp. 377-383. 
Hwang, M. S. and L. H. Li (2000) “A New Remote User Authentication Scheme Using Smart 
Cards,” IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics, 46(1), pp. 28-30.  
Ives, B., K. R. Walsh, and H. Schneider (2004) "The Domino Effect of Password Reuse," 
Communications of the ACM, 47(4), pp. 75-78. 
Jiang, R., L. Pan, and J. H. Li (2004) "Further Analysis of Password Authentication Schemes 
Based on Authentication Tests," Computers and Security, 23(6), pp. 469-477. 
Jobusch, D. L. and A. E. Oldehoeft (1989a) "A Survey of Password Mechanisms: Weaknesses 
and Potential Improvements, Part 1," Computers and Security, 8(7), pp. 587-604. 
Jobusch D. L. and A. E. Oldehoeft (1989b) "A Survey of Password Mechanisms: Weaknesses 
and Potential Improvements, Part 2," Computers and Security, 8(8), pp. 675-689. 
Jones, G. W. (2000) Introduction to Fingerprint Comparison, Springer, New York. 
Juang, W. S. (2004). "Efficient Password Authenticated Key Agreement Using Smart Cards," 
Computers and Security, 23(2), pp. 167-173. 
Kim, H. J. (1995). “Biometrics, Is it a Viable Proposition for Identity Authentication and Access 
Control?,” Computers and Security, 14(3), pp. 205-214. 
Lee, C. C., L. H. Li, and M. S. Hwang (2002) “A Remote User Authentication Scheme Using Hash 
Functions,” ACM Operating Systems Review, 36(4), pp. 23-29.  
Lee, C. C., M. S. Hwang, and W. P. Yang (2002) “A Flexible Remote User Authentication 
Scheme Using Smart Cards,” ACM Operating Systems Review, 36(3), pp. 46-52. 
Li, S. Z. and A. K. Jain (Eds.) (2005) Handbook of Face Recognition, New York:Springer. 
Li, S. Z., J. Lai, T. Tan, G. Feng, and Y. Wang (Eds.) (2004) "Advances in Biometric Person 
Authentication", 5th Chinese Conference on Biometric Recognition, SINOBIOMETRICS 
2004, Guangzhou, China, Proceedings Series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, New 
York: Springer. 
Li, S. Z., Z. Sun, T. Tan, S. Pankanti, D. Chollet, and D. Zhang (Eds.) (2005) "Advances in 
Biometric Person Authentication,” International Workshop on Biometric Recognition 
Systems, IWBRS 2005, Beijing, China, Proceedings Series: Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science, Vol. 3781, Springer, NY. 
Lopez, J., R. Oppliger, and G. Pernul (2004) "Authentication and Authorization Infrastructures 
(AAIs): A Comparative Survey," Computers and Security, 23(7), pp. 578-590. 
Maltoni, D., D. Maio, A. K. Jain, and S. Prabhakar (2003) Handbook of Fingerprint Recognition, 
New York” Springer. 
Matyas, S. M. and J. Stapleton (2000) "A Biometric Standard for Information Management and 
Security," Computers and Security, 19(5), pp. 428-441. 
Menkus, B. (1988) "Understanding the Use of Passwords," Computers and Security, 7(2), pp. 
132-136. 
Obaidat, M. and B. Sadoun (1997) “Verification of Computer Users Using Keystroke Dynamics,” 
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics. Part B: Cybernetics, 27(2), pp. 
261-269. 
O'Gorman, L. (2003) "Comparing Passwords, Tokens, and Biometrics for User Authentication,” 
Proceedings of the IEEE, 91(12), pp. 2019-2040. 
Oppliger, R. (2002) Security Technologies for the World Wide Web (2nd ed.), Artech House 
Publishers, Norwood, MA. 
Paans, R. and I. S. Herschberg (1987) "Computer Security: The Long Road Ahead," Computers 
and Security, 6(5), pp. 403-416. 
Identification and Authentication: Technology and Implementation Issues by M. Zviran and Z. Erlich 
Communications of Association for Information Systems (Volume 17 2006) 90-105 103 
Pernul, G. (1995) "Information Systems Security: Scope, State-of-the-Art, and Evaluation of 
Techniques," International Journal of Information Management, 15 (3), pp. 242-256. 
Pfleeger, C. P. (1989). Security in Computing, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Podd, J., J. Bunnell, and R. Henderson (1996) "Cost-Effective Computer Security: Cognitive and 
Associative Passwords," in J. Grundy & M. Apperley (Eds.), Proceedings of the Sixth 
Australian Conference on Computer-Human Interaction (OZCHI '96), pp. 304-305. 
Pond, R., J. Podd, J. Bunnell, and R. Henderson (2000) "Word Association Computer Passwords: 
The Effect of Formulation Techniques on Recall and Guessing Rates," Computers and 
Security, 19(7), pp. 645-656. 
Porter, S. N. (1982) "A Password Extension for Improved Human Factors," Computers and 
Security, 1(1), pp. 54-56. 
Prabhakar S., S. Pankanti, and A. K. Jain (2003) "Biometric Recognition: Security and Privacy 
Concerns," IEEE Security and Privacy Magazine, 1(2), pp. 33-42.  
Ratha, N. and R. Bolle (Eds.) (2005) Automatic Fingerprint Recognition Systems, New York: 
Springer.  
Riddle, B. L., M. S. Miron, and J. A. Semo (1989) "Passwords in Use in a University Timesharing 
Environment," Computers and Security, 8(7), pp. 569-579. 
Roddy, A. R. and J. D. Stosz (1997) “Fingerprint Features: Statistical Analysis and System 
Performance Estimates,” Proceedings of the IEEE, 85(9), pp.1390-1421. 
Sasse, M. A., S. Brostoff, and D. Weirich (2001) "Transforming the 'Weakest Link': A 
Human/Computer Interaction Approach to Usable and Effective Security," BT Technology 
Journal, 19(3), pp. 122-131.  
Smith, S. L. (1987) "Authenticating Users by Word Association," Computers and Security, 6(6), 
pp. 464-470. 
Smith, R. E. (2002) Authentication: From Passwords to Public Keys, Boston, MA: Addison-
Wesley,. 
Spector, Y. and J. Ginzberg (1994) "Pass-sentence: A New Approach to Computer Code", 
Computers and Security, 13(2), pp. 145-160. 
Sun, H.-M. (2000) “An Efficient Remote User Authentication Scheme Using Smart Cards,” IEEE 
Transactions on Consumer Electronics, 46(4), pp. 958-961. 
Thorpe, J. and P. van Oorschot (2004) "Graphical Dictionaries and the Memorable Space of 
Graphical Passwords," Proceedings of the 13th USENIX Security Symposium, San Diego, 
CA. 
Wayman, J., A. K. Jain, D. Maltoni, and D. Maio (Eds.) (2004) Biometric Systems: Technology, 
Design and Performance Evaluation, New York: Springer.  
Wiedenbeck, S., J. Waters, J.-C. Birget, A. Brodskiy, and N. Memon (2005) "PassPoints: Design 
and Longitudinal Evaluation of a Graphical Password System," International Journal of 
Human-Computer Studies, 63(1-2), pp.102-127. 
Wood, C. C. (1983) "Effective Information System Security with Password Controls," Computers 
and Security, 2(1), pp. 5-10.   
Wu, W. C. and S. M. Chen (2004) “Weaknesses and Improvements of an Efficient Password 
Based User Authentication Scheme Using Smart Cards”, IEEE Transactions on 
Consumer Electronic, 50(1), pp. 204-207. 
Wu, S.-T. and B.-C. Chieu (2003) "A User Friendly Remote Authentication Scheme with Smart 
Cards," Computers and Security, 22(6), pp. 547-550. 
Yan, J., A. Blackwell, R. Anderson, and A. Grant (2004) "Password Memorability And Security: 
Empirical Results", IEEE Security and Privacy, 2(5), pp. 25-31. 
Yan, J., A. Blackwell, R. Anderson, and A. Grant (2005) "The Memorability and Security of 
Passwords," in L. Cranor & S. Garfinkel (Eds.), Security and Usability: Designing Secure 
Systems That People Can Use, Sebastopol, CA: O'Reilly & Associates, pp. 121-124.  
Yang, C.-C. and R.-C. Wang (2004) "Cryptanalysis of a User Friendly Remote Authentication 
Scheme with Smart Cards," Computers and Security, 23(5), pp. 425-427.  
Yang, W. H. and S. P. Shieh (1999) "Password Authentication Schemes with Smart Card", 
Computers and Security, 18(8), pp. 727-733. 
Yu, E. and S. Cho (2004) "Keystroke Dynamics Identity Verification - Its Problems and Practical 
Solutions", Computers and Security, 23(5), pp. 428-440. 
Identification and Authentication: Technology and Implementation Issues by M. Zviran and Z. Erlich 
Communications of Association for Information Systems (Volume 17 2006) 90-105 104 
Zviran, M. and W. J. Haga (1990a) "Cognitive Passwords: The Key to Easy Access Control", 
Computers and Security, 9(8), pp. 723-736. 
Zviran, M. and W. J. Haga (1990b) “User Authentication by Cognitive Passwords: An Empirical 
Assessment”, Proceedings of the IEEE Jerusalem Conference on Information 
Technology 1990: Next Decade in Information Technology, pp. 137–144. 
Zviran, M. and W. J. Haga (1993) "A Comparison of Password Techniques for Multilevel 
Authentication Mechanisms", Journal of Computing, 36(3), pp. 227-237. 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS  
Associate password: A question-and-answer password in which the user provides the system 
with associated responses to rotating cues. 
Authentication: Users verify their identity. The three main approaches to user authentication are 
knowledge-based, possession-based, and biometric-based.  
Authorization: The system determines what the identified and authenticated user can actually 
access and what operations s/he is allowed to carry out. Authorization is based on predefined 
criteria and user profiles. 
Biometric-based authentication: Authentication based on what the user is, such as fingerprints 
and signature dynamics. It is based on anatomical, physiological or behavioral characteristics.  
Cognitive password: A question-and-answer password in which the user provides the system 
with answers to personal fact-based questions such as the user’s mother’s maiden name, or 
opinion-based questions such as the user’s favorite type of music.  
Identification: Users supply information to identify themselves, such as name, username, and 
user ID.  
Knowledge-based authentication: Authentication based on what the user knows, such as 
password, PIN, and question-and-answer. It is based on private information supplied by the user. 
Password: Knowledge-based authentication consisting of a secret series of characters according 
to some predefined rules. It is the most widely-used mechanism of authentication. 
Possession-based authentication: Authentication based on what the user has, such as 
memory cards and smart card tokens. Possession-based authentication is also referred to as 
token-based authentication. It is based on private objects that the user possesses. 
Primary password: Password that is used as the first level of authentication, allowing access to 
the information system resources through the operating system. 
Question-and-answer password: A session in which a user is presented with several randomly 
selected questions from a set of questions stored in the user’s profile in the operating system.  
The user’s answers are compared to those stored in the profile. Used mostly as a secondary 
password. The two main types of question-and-answer passwords are cognitive passwords and 
associative passwords.  
Secondary password: Password that is used as the second level of authentication, for further 
control and protection of multilevel access to segments of resources, sensitive applications, or 
data files. 
System-generated password: Password that is automatically generated by the operating 
system and assigned to a user. 
Token-based password: See possession based authentication.  
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User-generated password: Password that is generated by the user according to some system 
predefined rules. 
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